Introduction -- Understanding business preferences, strategies and influence -- Exporting to the world: policy contests in the oil and gas industries -- The war on coal: policy contests in the coal and utility industries -- The rise of renewable power: policy contests in the wind and solar industries -- Re-thinking business behaviour in the us energy sector -- What should policymakers do?
'Christian Downie's historical look at the negotiating behavior of the United States and the European Union during international efforts to implement a meaningful climate change treaty, go a long way toward explaining why current negotiations are bogged down. His findings about the impact of domestic politics on international negotiations should not be overlooked. The only way we will able to move to a new set of enforceable and meaningful greenhouse gas reduction commitments is to understand why past approaches have not worked.' (Lawrence Susskind, Harvard Law School, US). -- 'This is an enormously well-researched study that addresses an important hitherto-unanswered problem of negotiations. Usually single instances are analyzed but what about serial negotiations that return again and again to the subject, where the parties change position in their course? Downie tells us how this happens and in the process, enriches our understanding of negotiation. I enjoyed reading this book.' (I. William Zartman, The Johns Hopkins University, US). -- The Politics of Climate Change Negotiations describes the successes and failures of protracted international negotiations and most importantly, examines the lessons they hold for the future. Drawing on more than 100 interviews with climate change insiders, including former ministers, chief negotiators and presidential advisers, Christian Downie presents a rare inside account of why states agree to what they do and why they change their position in long negotiations. He also identifies eight strategies that others can use to influence the most powerful states in the world. This book will be invaluable to academics and students working in the fields of international relations, political science, negotiation studies and global environmental politics. It will be of equal value to diplomats, policymakers and various non-governmental organizations that seek to influence international negotiations.
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In policy domains characterised by complexity, international organizations (IOs) with overlapping mandates and governance functions regularly interact in ways that have important implications for global governance. Yet the dynamics of IO interactions remain understudied. This article breaks new ground by building on the theoretical insights of organizational ecology to examine IO competition, cooperation, and adaptation in the domain of energy. Drawing on original empirical data, I consider three related hypotheses: (1) competition between IOs in the same population is likely to centre on material resources; (2) IOs are more likely to cooperate when they have a shared governance goal; and (3) individual IOs can adapt by changing their goals and boundaries. In considering these hypotheses, this article highlights the limits of the organizational ecology approach and the need to broaden it to account for the possibility that IOs do cooperate, and that individual IOs, such as the International Energy Agency, have the capacity to adapt to changes in their environment.
AbstractIn policy domains characterised by complexity, international organizations (IOs) with overlapping mandates and governance functions regularly interact in ways that have important implications for global governance. Yet the dynamics of IO interactions remain understudied. This article breaks new ground by building on the theoretical insights of organizational ecology to examine IO competition, cooperation, and adaptation in the domain of energy. Drawing on original empirical data, I consider three related hypotheses: (1) competition between IOs in the same population is likely to centre on material resources; (2) IOs are more likely to cooperate when they have a shared governance goal; and (3) individual IOs can adapt by changing their goals and boundaries. In considering these hypotheses, this article highlights the limits of the organizational ecology approach and the need to broaden it to account for the possibility that IOs do cooperate, and that individual IOs, such as the International Energy Agency, have the capacity to adapt to changes in their environment.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in exploring indirect governance at the global level. However, very little work has considered these relationships in the domain of energy. In fragmented global governance domains, such as energy, the G20 has frequently been identified as an actor capable of steering other actors via indirect forms of governance. Yet to date,we do not have answers to key questions including, what is the range of actors being enrolled by the G20? And what governance functions are these actors enrolled to perform? To answer these questions, I utilize a novel database of G20 enrollment since 2008, which shows that the G20 enrolls international organizations more frequently than any other actor, and that agenda setting is the most commonly performed governance function. These data are then matched with qualitative interview data to make descriptive inferences about the patterns of global energy governance, including the extent of fragmentation, the identity of focal actors, and the G20's steering role, and how these patterns have changed over time. ; The project was supported by an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DE180100898)
AbstractIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in exploring indirect governance at the global level. However, very little work has considered these relationships in the domain of energy. In fragmented global governance domains, such as energy, the G20 has frequently been identified as an actor capable of steering other actors via indirect forms of governance. Yet to date, we do not have answers to key questions including, what is the range of actors being enrolled by the G20? And what governance functions are these actors enrolled to perform? To answer these questions, I utilize a novel database of G20 enrollment since 2008, which shows that the G20 enrolls international organizations more frequently than any other actor, and that agenda setting is the most commonly performed governance function. These data are then matched with qualitative interview data to make descriptive inferences about the patterns of global energy governance, including the extent of fragmentation, the identity of focal actors, and the G20's steering role, and how these patterns have changed over time.
AbstractIn the field of business and politics, research on the role of business actors in individual fossil fuel industries that contribute to climate change has been sparse. At the same time theorising the role of ad hoc coalitions has been limited even though they appear to be an important vehicle for business actors seeking to shape contemporary policy contests. This paper attempts to address these understudied areas by drawing on a rich empirical dataset to examine the role of three ad hoc coalitions in the U.S. energy sector. In doing so, it builds on the existing literature to establish a theoretical basis for identifying the defining elements of ad hoc coalitions and the conditions under which business actors decide to establish them. Further, it sheds light on how business actors use ad hoc coalitions in three key fossil fuel industries—gas, oil, and coal—to shape policy outcomes, and in turn shape the path to a clean energy transition.
Over the last two decades, business actors have received growing attention in global environmental politics. In the context of climate change, scholars have demonstrated the capacity of business actors to directly shape outcomes at the national, international, and transnational levels. However, very little work has focused exclusively on business actors in the coal and utility industries. This is surprising, given that resistance from these industries could delay or even derail government attempts to address climate change. Accordingly, this article focuses directly on the preferences of business actors in the coal and utility industries. Drawing on interviews with executives across the US energy sector, it considers business preferences on two of the most important attempts by the Obama administration to limit emissions from coal: the Waxman-Markey bill and the Clean Power Plan. In doing so, it provides new insights about the preferences of these actors and the divisions within these industries that could be exploited by policy-makers and activists seeking to enact climate change regulations.
It is widely accepted that the rising power of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—has the potential to re-shape the international system. However, little attention has been given to the BRICs' role in a growing area of strategic importance: global energy governance. While global governance scholars now argue that the international energy architecture requires substantive reform to keep pace with the rapid transformations in global energy markets, largely driven by the BRICs, it is not clear what role these countries will play in future governance arrangements. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance and international negotiations, interviews with G20 energy officials, and the observations of the author, a past delegate to G20 negotiations, this article examines whether the BRICs as a coalition have the capacity and willingness to drive substantive global energy governance reform. In doing so, it highlights the problems with the BRICs as a coalition on energy and considers the prospects for energy reform in light of China's increasing engagement with energy governance ahead of it hosting the G20 Summit in 2016.
It is widely accepted that the rising power of the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—has the potential to re-shape the international system. However, little attention has been given to the BRICs' role in a growing area of strategic importance: global energy governance. While global governance scholars now argue that the international energy architecture requires substantive reform to keep pace with the rapid transformations in global energy markets, largely driven by the BRICs, it is not clear what role these countries will play in future governance arrangements. Drawing on recent scholarship in global governance and international negotiations, interviews with G20 energy officials, and the observations of the author, a past delegate to G20 negotiations, this article examines whether the BRICs as a coalition have the capacity and willingness to drive substantive global energy governance reform. In doing so, it highlights the problems with the BRICs as a coalition on energy and considers the prospects for energy reform in light of China's increasing engagement with energy governance ahead of it hosting the G20 Summit in 2016.
